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Scott Helme

scotthelme.co.ukDR 77 Accessible 300 views

Ontwikkeling en programmeren Personal blog of security researcher Scott Helme, covering web security, TLS, certificate authorities and browser security.

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This post is a detailed technical breakdown of how eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys were found to be trivially weak, some being single small integers. It shows how the keys were recovered from public certificates in milliseconds and traces the browser vendors' rapid response. Valuable for

Site introduction

Scott Helme is a security researcher, entrepreneur and international speaker who specialises in web technologies. His site is a personal blog where he publishes technical write-ups on web security, TLS, certificate authorities and browser security mechanisms. The content is aimed at practitioners who want detailed, first-hand analysis rather than general news.

The core of the site is in-depth articles based on original research and hands-on investigation. In this post, Helme examines eight eMudhra intermediate certificate authority private keys that turned out to be extremely weak, including one that was simply the number 4. He describes recovering all of them from public certificates on a laptop in under a second, and documents the timeline of browser vendors blocking the certificates and removing the root.

The site suits security professionals, web developers, PKI administrators and anyone following the certificate authority ecosystem. Readers should expect technical detail and direct commentary. It is a useful resource for understanding how trust in the CA system can fail and how quickly the industry responds.

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